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Abstract. Kingdon’s multiple streams approach is popular because its metaphor and flexible 
concepts can be applied empirically in most contexts. However, this feature is also its 
weakness. Most scholars apply MSA superficially, without describing its metaphor’s meaning 
or connecting concepts to empirical results. This article solves this problem by producing one 
MSA narrative from a diverse collection of empirical studies. Our hero is the ‘policy 
entrepreneur’ who knows that the pursuit of ambitious aims such as ‘evidence-based 
policymaking’ requires framing a problem, having a solution ready, and exploiting the motive 
and opportunity of policymakers to select it. 
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Introduction: how to improve the multiple streams narrative  
The multiple streams approach (MSA) is one of policy scholarship’s biggest successes. 
Kingdon’s (1984) study is one the highest cited books in policy studies, there is a thriving 
programme of empirical application and theoretical refinement, its lessons are applied regularly 
in interdisciplinary studies, and it is relatively well known and enjoyed by practitioners and 
students (Herweg et al, 2015; 2017; Zahariadis, 2007; 2014; Jones et al, 2016).  
Yet, its success is built on shaky foundations because its alleged strength – its flexible metaphor 
of streams and windows of opportunity - is actually its weakness. Most scholars describe MSA 
superficially, fail to articulate the meaning of its metaphor, do not engage with state of the art 
developments, and struggle to apply its concepts systematically to empirical research (Jones et 
al, 2016). These limitations create an acute scientific problem: most scholars apply MSA 
without connecting it to a coherent research agenda. Consequently, it is difficult to produce 
new knowledge systematically or describe with confidence the accumulated wisdom of MSA. 
As the special issue on ‘Practical lessons from policy theories’ shows, this problem is a feature 
of many policy theories which have expanded far beyond their original intentions (Weible and 
Cairney, 2018). 
There have been some recent attempts to solve this problem by encouraging conceptual clarity 
via hypothesis production and testing (Cairney and Jones, 2016; Cairney and Zahariadis, 2016; 
Herweg et al, 2015). However, this solution only appeals to a niche audience of MSA scholars. 
Most readers and users of MSA draw on Kingdon’s (1984) classic metaphor without taking 
their research to the next level by engaging with over 30 years of subsequent research and 
theoretical refinement. Kingdon’s study of US federal politics in the 1980s can only take us so 
far. Therefore, we need a more profound solution that draws the attention of all MSA users to 
state of the art research, its applications, refinements, and contemporary implications. Its 
success will provide benefits to everyone, from the expert scholar to the new student. 
I solve this problem in three ways. First, I turn lessons from individual studies and systematic 
and qualitative reviews of the literature into a coherent MSA narrative. If successful, this 
narrative will become the primary reference point for policy scholars seeking to conduct new 
empirical research and explain MSA to new audiences such as students, practitioners, and 
scholars from other disciplines. It will therefore serve as a valuable heuristic: if they have not 
read this article, they have not done their homework. 
Second, I apply this narrative to a profoundly important topic for interdisciplinary scholars and 
policymakers – the politics of ‘evidence based policymaking’ – to show how to make the MSA 
story as memorable, widely understood, and correctly applied as possible. The result is a theory 
whose flexibility, undoubted popularity, and wide application does not come at the expense of 
conceptual clarity.  
Third, I focus primarily on ‘policy entrepreneurs’ as the heroes of the MSA story. Policymakers 
have to ignore most policy problems and most ways to understand and solve them. When their 
attention lurches to a problem, it is too late to produce a new solution. Their motive to select 
any solution is fleeting, during a brief ‘window of opportunity’. So, I structure the article 
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around the three strategies that effective policy entrepreneurs combine to adapt to these 
limitations in their complex and unpredictable environment:  
1. telling a good story to grab the audience’s interest,  
2. producing feasible solutions in anticipation of attention to problems, and  
3. adapting their strategy to the specific nature of each ‘window’. In large systems, they 
are like surfers waiting for the ‘big wave’, but in small subsystems they can be like 
Poseidon moving the ‘streams’.  
Therefore, a focus on the MSA story and the strategies of entrepreneurs helps consolidate the 
research agenda for specialist policy scholars and explain real world policymaking to anyone 
hitherto attached to romantic stories of ‘evidence based policymaking’ in which we expect 
policymakers to produce ‘rational’ decisions in a policy cycle with predictable, linear stages. 
How does the multiple streams story begin? 
The MSA story begins as an antidote to the biggest work of fiction in policy studies: rational 
policymaking during a policy cycle. In an ideal-type world, policymaking would not seem so 
counterintuitive. ‘Comprehensively rational’ policymakers would combine their values with 
evidence to define policy problems and their aims, ‘neutral’ bureaucracies would produce 
multiple possible solutions consistent with those aims, and policymakers would select the ‘best’ 
or most ‘evidence based’ solution. This act would set in motion a cycle of stages including 
legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and the choice to maintain or change policy. The 
policy process would be predictable, and all actors would know how to engage with 
policymakers to translate their evidence into policy. We describe this fictional story of 
‘comprehensive rationality’ and the ‘policy cycle’ as an ideal-type to compare with more 
realistic stories of complexity and unpredictable policymaking (Cairney, 2016: 16-9). 
In the real world, policymaking often seems counterintuitive. There is too much information, 
and policymakers have to ignore most policy problems and most ways to understand and try to 
solve them. They use ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ cognitive short cuts to help them pay attention 
to a manageable number of issues, and address policy problems without fully understanding 
them (Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 2017). When their attention lurches to a policy problem, it is 
too late to produce a new solution that is technically feasible and acceptable to policymakers. 
Their willingness and ability to select a policy solution is fleeting, during a brief ‘window of 
opportunity’ in which all key factors – heightened attention to a problem, an available and 
feasible solution, and the motive to select it – must come together at the same time, or the 
opportunity is lost (Kingdon, 1984).  
Our heroes are the successful ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who do not get discouraged by this more 
confusing story. The policy literature describes ‘policy entrepreneur’ in many ways (Beeson 
and Stone, 2013; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996: 431; Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Bakir et al, 
2017; Jones, 1994: 196; John, 1999: 45; Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015; Laffan, 1997; Roberts 
and King, 1991). However, as described by our chosen narrator (Kingdon, 1984: 165-6), they 
are the agents for policy change who possess the knowledge, power, tenacity, and luck to be 
able to exploit key opportunities. Entrepreneurs invest their time wisely for future reward, and 
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possess key skills that help them adapt particularly well to their environments (Cairney, 2012: 
272). 
Entrepreneurs use three strategies to maximise their impact in crowded, complex, and often 
unpredictable policy environments. First, they know that agenda setting is about exercising 
power to generate attention for some issues over others, and establishing one way of thinking 
about problems at the expense of the others. To that end, entrepreneurs identify how to 
manipulate or reinforce the cognitive biases of influential policymakers. For example, they tell 
simple and persuasive stories combining facts with values and emotional appeals, engaging in 
coalitions and networks to establish trust in the messenger, and investing for the long term to 
learn the language of policy in key venues.  
Second, they know that timing matters. There is not enough time to find a new policy solution 
during heightened attention to a policy problem. Instead, they develop technically and 
politically feasible solutions - in other words, they could work as intended and be acceptable 
to enough people in policy networks - and wait for the right time to present them to 
policymakers during a ‘window of opportunity’.  
Third, they know how to adapt to their environment to exploit, or help create, ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for action, in which policymakers have some motive to select a policy solution 
during heightened attention to a problem. The power of entrepreneurs can change markedly 
according to the scale of the policymaking environment. For Kingdon (1984), policy 
entrepreneurs in the US federal environment were ‘surfers waiting for the big wave’, 
suggesting that the environment is more important to explanation than the skills of individual 
actors. More recently, there have been hundreds of applications of MSA across the globe, 
generating new insights and practical implications (Jones et al, 2016). In particular, studies of 
subnational government, or policymaking in smaller countries or regions, suggest that 
entrepreneurs can – under particular conditions - be more influential than Kingdon (1984) 
suggested.  
MSA tells a persuasive story about the role of timing and fleeting opportunity in politics. The 
attention of policymakers lurches frequently, but it is rare for them to possess a fully ‘evolved’ 
policy solution before their attention lurches elsewhere.  Consequently, attention can rise and 
fall without producing major policy change.  
MSA contrasts with the story of a linear policy cycle in which each stage appears in 
chronological order, and attention to the nature of a problem sets in motion the production and 
delivery of a solution. Instead, three key factors - problem definition, policy solution, and 
politics (motive and opportunity) – are separate ‘streams’ which rarely ‘couple’ during a 
window of opportunity.  
If described – rather confusingly - as water, the multiple streams metaphor suggests that, when 
streams come together, they are hard to separate.  Or, if we describe the need for the ‘stars to 
align’ we overemphasise the role of serendipity and events completely out of the control of 
actors (in this scenario, ‘no one can rewrite the stars’). Instead, a ‘window of opportunity’ is 
best described as akin to a space launch in which policymakers will abort the mission unless 
every relevant factor is just right. Some factors are not in the gift of humans (such as the 
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environmental conditions), but others are (such as the choices we make on technology, 
resources, and the rules governing lift-off). This metaphor suggests that the ‘coupling’ of 
streams is not inevitable, but entrepreneurs can help make things happen because they know 
the importance of framing problems to generate attention, to have a solution ready, and to help 
create and exploit infrequent opportunities to act.  
Such strategies may be known to policy scientists, but scholars do not tell the same story. We 
should not underestimate the vulnerability of MSA to poor scientific practice if we do not tell 
its story consistently and accumulate knowledge systematically. Further, we should not 
underestimate the profound novelty and value of these insights to the researchers from many 
disciplines and professions, who are interested in the relationship between evidence and policy, 
but are more familiar with romantic stories of ‘evidence based policymaking’ in which we 
should expect policymakers to produce  ‘rational’ decisions in a policy cycle with predictable, 
linear stages. MSA provides an equally memorable and attractive story with more value to 
scholars and practitioners. It provides three ways to be more effective in politics and less 
disappointed in the gulf between real world and fantasy policymaking.  
Entrepreneurs know why it is important to tell a good story about a policy problem 
It is a truism in policy studies that ‘the evidence’ does not speak for itself. Someone needs to 
speak up for a policy problem in a way that sparks the attention and concern of their audience. 
This act does not involve providing more and more evidence, based on the misguided 
assumption that it will takes us closer to the type of ‘comprehensive rationality’ associated with 
‘evidence based policymaking’ (EBPM) (Cairney, 2016: 15-18; Douglas, 2009). Rather, early 
post-war studies identified the implications of ‘bounded rationality’ when, for example, 
policymakers used ‘rules of thumb’ to limit their analysis and trial and error strategies to 
produce ‘good enough’ decisions (Simon, 1976: xxviii; Lindblom, 1959: 88). Then, modern 
theories took forward psychological insights (Kahneman, 2012; Haidt, 2001) to identify two 
drivers of agenda setting dynamics, whose implications are identified in table 1.  
First, policymakers can only pay attention to a tiny proportion of their responsibilities, so they 
ignore most evidence and promote very few issues to the top of their agenda (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993). They can only pay attention to one of many possible ways to understand and seek 
to solve problems, and this attention relates more to the beliefs of policymakers, and persuasion 
strategies of influencers, than the size of the problem or evidence base for its solution (Majone, 
1989: 24; Dearing and Rogers, 1996). Second, policymakers draw on emotion, moral 
reasoning, gut instinct, and habit as shortcuts to gathering information, to understand complex 
policy problems in simple ways (Lewis, 2013; Cairney and Kwiatkowski, 2017; Lodge and 
Wegrich, 2016). In other words, they pay attention to things they care about, or are already 
familiar with. 
Consequently, entrepreneurs know not to bombard policymakers with more and more 
information as a way to generate attention, since it may have the opposite effect. Rather, they 
adapt to the ways in which policymakers combine ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ thinking to sift 
large amounts of potentially relevant information. They perform the role of ‘problem broker’, 
to influence how policymakers understand a policy problem, and ‘knowledge broker’, to 
supply the concise evidence that is most relevant to this understanding (Knaggård, 2015: 453). 
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Agenda setters build on the issues ‘already in the back of people’s minds’ (Kingdon, 1984: 
103). As the wider public policy literature suggests, they combine evidence and emotional 
appeals (True et al, 2007), tell simple stories with heroes and morals (McBeth et al, 2014), 
romanticise their own cause while demonizing their opponents (Sabatier et al, 1987), and/or 
exploit stereotypes of social groups to describe why governments should only give resources 
to the ‘deserving’ (Schneider and Ingram, 1993; 1997; 2005). These ways to exercise power – 
with reference to the beliefs and psychology of policymakers – can be as important as the 
material resources of actors (Kingdon, 1984: 133; 131).  
Table 1 Strategies for the ‘problem stream’: how to influence the policy agenda 
Insight Implication for strategy 
Few problems reach the top of the agenda, 
and attention to problems is not dependent on 
the evidence of their size 
Find ways to draw attention to problems by 
focusing on the beliefs of your audience 
more than your assessment of the evidence 
Policymakers use ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ 
ways to process a lot of information in a short 
space of time 
Adapt to the cognitive biases of influential 
policymakers, and frame policy solutions as 
consistent with dominant ways to understand 
problems 
There are many ways to frame any policy 
problem, and evidence often plays a limited 
role in problem definition  
Combine evidence with framing strategies, 
persuasion, and storytelling 
Limited time forces people to make choices 
before their preferences are clear 
Adapt to ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ ways in 
which policymakers short-cut decisions  
Policymakers seek to reduce ambiguity as 
much as uncertainty 
If you simply bombard policymakers with 
evidence, they will have little reason to read 
it. If you win the ‘framing battle’, 
policymakers will demand evidence on your 
problem and solution  
Source: adapted from Cairney and Kwitakowski (2017) 
Entrepreneurs recognise the key distinction between the exercise of power to reduce ambiguity 
and the production of evidence to reduce uncertainty (Zahariadis, 2007: 66; Baumgartner and 
Jones, 1993: 31; Majone, 1989; Cairney, 2012a: 234). Uncertainty describes a lack of 
knowledge. Scientists often focus on producing more high quality evidence to reduce 
uncertainty, using evidence to measure the size of a known problem and the effectiveness of a 
relevant solution (Cairney et al, 2016; Cairney and Oliver, 2017).  
More importantly, ambiguity describes the ability to support more than one way to understand 
and describe a policy problem. We reduce ambiguity by choosing one policy ‘image’. That 
choice narrows our analysis and produces the conditions under which we can use evidence to 
reduce uncertainty. This is not a ‘scientific’ process, even if actors can use scientific evidence 
to make their case. Rather, agenda setting – or problem definition – is about ‘framing’ issues, 
or drawing the highest attention to one image by accentuating some facts and omitting others, 
linking problems to deeply held beliefs and values, using simple stories to assign cause and 
responsibility, exploiting crises or events, selecting the measures that produce the most 
supportive evidence of a problem, and tailoring these strategies to different audiences 
(Rochefort and Cobb, 1994: vii; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005: 8; Baumgartner and Jones, 
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1993: 107–8; 113; Hogwood, 1987: 30; Stone, 1989: 282–3; 2002: 191; Dearing and Rogers, 
1996: 37–9; Birkland, 1997).  
For example, tobacco control is often treated as a model for evidence advocates, in which the 
scientific evidence played a key role in debate at a national and international level (Cairney et 
al, 2012). Yet, the availability of evidence produced with scientific rigour was only one part of 
the agenda setting story, in which advocates of tobacco control also learned to: combine the 
scientific evidence on the harms of smoking, and harms of environmental tobacco smoke, with 
emotional appeals regarding the harms to children; challenge the frames of their competitors 
by quantifying the economic costs of smoking; reframe the implications of key values, such as 
the right to health and clean air over the right to smoke; and, generate a sense of crisis by 
describing smoking as a ‘non-communicable disease’ (NCD), ‘epidemic’, or public health 
‘crisis’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 114; Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017; Cairney, 2016a: 67-
72).  
Entrepreneurs have a solution ready to chase a problem 
It is a major but temporary achievement to focus policymaker attention on one way of 
understanding a policy problem. It must be acted upon quickly, before attention shifts 
elsewhere. Further, since policymakers will not dwell on problems that cannot be solved, a 
well thought out solution must already exist before a lurch of attention (Kingdon, 1984: 103). 
So, entrepreneurs respond to the counterintuitive nature of the agenda setting process: politics 
is about well-established solutions chasing problems, not producing solutions when 
policymakers identify problems. 
In other words, problem definition is only one part of the puzzle; a necessary but insufficient 
condition for major policy change. Instead of viewing agenda setting as one stage in a linear 
process in which problem definition is followed by formulation, legitimation, and 
implementation, MSA draws on the ‘garbage can model’ of choice in which policymaking 
organizations are, ‘collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for 
decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they 
might be an answer, and decision makers looking for work’ (Cohen et al., 1972: 1). This is 
‘organized anarchy’ in which ‘stages’ should be viewed instead as ‘relatively independent 
streams’ which come together in a mess of activity: some actors articulate a poor or contested 
understanding of problems in relation to their vague aims, some have their preferred solutions 
and are looking to attach them to problems, and policymakers have unclear motives when 
selecting them (1972: 16).  
Kingdon (1984) extended this focus on multiple streams to the US federal arena, to describe 
the conditions under which major policy change would take place. In particular, when 
policymaker attention lurches to a policy problem, a technically and politically feasible solution 
must already be available to address the problem defined by policymakers. Further, while 
attention lurches quickly from issue to issue, viable solutions involving major policy change 
take years or decades to develop. Kingdon describes ideas in a ‘policy primeval soup’, evolving 
or ‘softening’ as they are proposed by one actor then reconsidered and modified by a large 
number of participants (who may also have to be ‘softened up’ to new ideas). To deal with this 
disconnect between lurching attention and slow policy development, they try to develop 
widely-accepted solutions in anticipation of future problems, then find the right time to exploit 
or encourage attention to a relevant problem (1984: 181). 
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This insight should not be understated, and the implications laid out in table 2 can have a 
profound impact on people seeking policy influence. In particular, for people new to politics, 
who possess the reasonable expectation that we generate solutions after we identify problems, 
it will seem counterintuitive that there is not enough time to do so. Yet, attention lurches 
quickly from issue to issue, and the motive to act is temporary, so ‘When the time for action 
arrives, when the policy window … opens, it is too late to develop a new proposal from scratch. 
It must have already gone through this process of consideration, floating up, discussion, 
revision and trying out again’ (1984: 149). Therefore, ‘advocates lie in wait in and around 
government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can 
attach their solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their 
advantage’ (Kingdon 1984: 165–6). 
Table 2 Strategies for the policy stream: how to develop and gain support for policy solutions 
Insight Implication 
There is no linear policy cycle in which 
policymakers identify problems, formulate 
solutions, and make a choice 
Generate technically and politically feasible 
policy solutions and seek opportunities to 
sell them during heightened attention 
Solutions take time to ‘soften’ to become 
accepted within policy networks 
Form coalitions with allies, and engage in 
networks, to identify how to modify and 
generate support for policy solutions 
Source: adapted from Cairney and Zahariadis (2016) and Mintrom and Norman (2009). 
MSA therefore helps clarify the role of ‘timing’ and idioms such as ‘being in the right place at 
the right time’ in policymaking. The absence of good timing is listed frequently as a major 
barrier to the use of scientific evidence in policy, prompting scholars to recognise the need for 
good networks to help spot opportunities, while recognising the ‘serendipitous nature of the 
policy process’ (Oliver et al, 2014a: 4).  This emphasis on timing as serendipity is also 
reinforced in some studies of the policy implications of MSA (Avery, 2004; Howie, 2009; 
Pralle, 2009). Yet, entrepreneurs also help create windows of opportunity and have solutions 
ready when the time is right. 
Just how long it takes to ‘soften’ a solution and wait for the right opportunity is unclear, but 
note the use of different metaphors. Smith (2014) describes the chameleon-like nature of ideas, 
suggesting they can potentially change quickly to adapt to a new environment. However, 
Kingdon (1984) uses a ‘Darwinian’ evolutionary metaphor, which suggests ‘the slow progress 
of an idea towards acceptability’ within policy networks, which might take decades (Cairney, 
2013: 281). In such cases, evidence advocates should prepare for the long haul and expect 
limited short term influence (Boswell and Smith, 2017). Indeed, even if they expect a new 
government to arrive with new ideas, or a new level of receptivity to solutions, they still need 
to be ready with a well worked out solution. 
Entrepreneurs know when to ‘surf the waves’ or try to move the sea  
To produce major policy change, policymakers have to possess the motive to pay attention to 
a problem and adopt the proposed solution. This motive is fleeting, during a ‘window of 
opportunity’. Potential causes of a shift in receptivity to a policy solution include: ‘Swings of 
national mood, vagaries of public opinion, election results, changes of administration … and 
interest group pressure campaigns’ (Kingdon, 1984: 19). To return to the metaphor of a timely 
space launch out of the control of any single actor, our attention should shift to the importance 
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of a ‘policy environment’. In most modern policy theories, this ‘environmental’ relates to the 
attitudes of many potentially influential audiences (actors at multiple levels of government or 
in key venues), the rules and norms of information gathering and behaviour in key venues, the 
supportive coalitions and networks, and the most relevant socioeconomic trends and key events 
(Heikkila and Cairney, 2017; Cairney and Weible, 2017) 
In Kingdon’s original study, Darwinian and environmental metaphors describe the vast scale 
of US federal-level politics and policymaking, in which it is difficult to imagine that one 
entrepreneur could do anything but adapt to rather than shape their environment. Modern MSA 
studies help shift that image somewhat. Jones et al (2016) identify 311 MSA applications 
published from 2000–2014, of which 132 are to the US, 205 to European countries or the EU, 
and 140 studies are outside both (many compare systems, so the number is above 311). The 
MSA has inspired applications in at least 65 countries and over 100 applications to subnational 
policymaking. This breadth of focus is also reflected in Zahariadis’ (2014) ‘illustrative list’ of 
41 texts, used by Cairney and Jones (2016: 44) to provide a more qualitative analysis of the 
modern insights generated by MSA studies. In it, there are national (20), subnational (13), and 
international (8) applications (including the EU and UN); and, while the US and Europe 
account for most, there are enough non-traditional applications – in countries such as China 
and Burkina Faso – to explore the extent to which practical lessons from the federal US extend 
to other countries or levels of government (see also Rawat and Morris, 2016). 
Using these new studies, we can say that the insights from tables 1 and 2 have a ‘universal’ 
quality, in which they can be applied to any time or place (Cairney and Jones, 2016: 39), but 
their implications can change markedly in different applications.  
To demonstrate, first consider key aspects of the context in which Kingdon generated his 
original analysis, and the new questions that arise if we shift our focus to other case studies: 
 Few problems reach the top of the agenda because US federal policy can apply to almost 
all aspects of social and political life. What happens when some venues only consider 
a small number of issues? 
 There are many ways to define issues, and the US ‘macropolitical’ level resembles an 
‘issue network’ in which there are many actors competing to define issues 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Heclo, 1978). What happens in less competitive arenas 
where some definitions dominate debate for years or decades? 
 Problems, policies, and politics are separate ‘streams’ partly as a function of the size of 
the US system and limits to key roles, such as when the President sets agendas but other 
actors generate solutions. What happens when key actors can become influential in 
more than one stream? 
 The ‘policy primeval soup’ metaphor works for a US political system in which solutions 
take time to ‘soften’ and a piece of legislation may only gain traction when a large 
number of actors in a policy networks have engaged with and modified the original 
policy proposal. What happens when this initial process happens externally, such as in 
international organisations or networks or in other countries? The role of ‘policy 
transfer’ is discussed more in non-US or subnational US studies (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996). 
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 MSA began as a study of a two-party political system with a division of powers between 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. What happens in parliamentary systems in 
which the role of the executive and multi-party competition is more important (Herweg 
et al, 2015)?  
Generally, outside of Kingdon’s original study, there is often more scope for entrepreneurs to 
influence their environment or generate a wider range of strategies. Although the literature on 
this specific topic is patchy, and it is often difficult to compare cases (Jones et al, 2016; Cairney 
and Jones, 2016), key studies provide the following preliminary insights (table 3). 
Table 3 Strategies for the ‘politics stream’ and to exploit ‘windows of opportunity’ 
Insight Implication for strategy 
Actors dissatisfied with progress in one 
policymaking venue can seek more 
sympathetic audiences elsewhere 
Engage in ‘venue shopping’ to encourage 
‘venue shift’ and reduce the need to ‘soften’ 
policy solutions 
Policymakers often import policy solutions 
from other political systems, which may 
reduce the need to ‘soften’ solutions in 
domestic networks 
Engage in multi-level policy networks to 
seek opportunities to import ‘pre-softened’ 
policy solutions 
Policy entrepreneurs can be more effective at 
a smaller scale of government 
Recognise your potential role, as a surfer on 
the waves, or Poseidon moving them 
In some systems, or during crises, the usual 
rules of MSA do not apply. Some MSA 
insights are not ‘universal’ 
Do your homework on specific political 
systems, to understand the idiosyncrasies of 
the policy environment 
The most frequent or predictable policy 
windows could be elections 
Do not simply equate a ‘window of 
opportunity’ with unpredictable serendipity. 
Link problems to election debates, and seek 
solutions demonstrably popular with key 
parts of the public 
Policymakers often select vague solutions to 
ill-defined problems during a policy window.  
Do not put your faith in the policy cycle to 
ensure that broad intentions translate into the 
delivery of specific solutions 
Source: adapted from Cairney and Jones (2016) 
Venue shop and frame issues to promote venue shift  
MSA suggests that policy solutions only become feasible when they are acceptable to enough 
actors in key venues such as policymaking institutions or networks (Kingdon refers broadly to 
the ‘policy community’, but beware the potential for terminological confusion - Cairney, 2012: 
235; 179). Punctuated equilibrium theory modifies this expectation by focusing on the role of 
venue shopping, when actors are dissatisfied with progress in one venue and seek more 
sympathetic audiences elsewhere (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 35–7). If successful, they 
short-cut the ‘softening’ process in venues where audiences are more sympathetic to policy 
change (1993: 32–3; Cairney, 2013: 282).  
Some modern MSA applications, particularly in the EU, use this insight to show that 
competition to reduce ambiguity relates simultaneously to problem definition and defining the 
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most appropriate venue to address it (Ackrill and Kay, 2011, Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2013). In 
other words, the main definition of a policy problem can determine the venue held responsible 
for solving it: if tobacco is primarily a public health epidemic, rely on a health department; if 
it is a valuable commodity for trade and taxation, rely on trade and treasury departments 
(Cairney et al, 2012). 
However, we should be careful not to overstate the frequency and potential of such shifts, 
particularly if we assume that actors in each venue can be possessive about policy issues. 
Successful venue shift involves a level of energy not available to many actors. For example, 
Cairney (2006; 2007b; 2009) initially described the reframing of a ban on smoking in public 
places - as a public health issue (a Scottish Parliament responsibility) rather than health and 
safety (Westminster) – as one of potentially many venue shifts, only to fail to see another 
example in the next 10 years. 
Learn how to short-cut the softening process by importing pre-softened solutions 
Non-US and subnational US studies identify the role of policy transfer and diffusion as a 
relatively quick way to shortcut the softening process. Policy transfer can be a response to 
‘bounded rationality’: policymakers and influencers use external examples of successful policy 
innovation to set the agenda and present already-solved policy problems. Or, in some cases, 
federal, supranational bodies, and international organisations (or powerful countries like the 
US) put pressure on others to import policy solutions (Berry and Berry, 2014; Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996; Rose, 2005; Cairney, 2012: 108). Modern MSA studies identify many examples 
of the role of policy transfer in short-cutting the ‘softening’ process associated with Kingdon’s 
original study (Bache, 2012; Bache & Reardon, 2013; Cairney, 2009; Liu, Lindquist, Vedlitz, 
& Vincent, 2011; McLendon, 2003; Zahariadis, 2004).  
Again, we should not overestimate the potential effect of policy transfer. External policymakers 
provide the source of new solutions, but MSA helps explain the conditions under which they 
would be accepted during a ‘policy transfer window’ (Cairney, 2012: 269–71). For example, 
most countries agreed to the same package of policy solutions in the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, but very few have the environments conducive to the adoption 
of those policy instruments during subsequent policy windows. Consequently, the 
implementation of imported policy solutions is highly uneven (Cairney and Yamazaki, 2017) 
and, in some countries, almost non-existent (Mamudu et al, 2015). 
Identify the conditions under which entrepreneurs emulate Poseidon 
Subnational MSA studies suggest that policy entrepreneurs can be more effective at ‘a smaller 
and/or more local scale of government’ (Cairney and Jones, 2016: 46). Henstra (2010), Oborn 
et al (2011), and Dudley (2013) identify examples of scales small enough for an entrepreneur 
to influence all three streams successfully: $100k funding for a Canadian municipal emergency 
management policy, healthcare reform inside London, and the London mayor as framer and 
audience for a road congestion charge. Robinson and Eller (2010) also find that, in Texas 
schools policy, the streams are not separate in the way Kingdon describes, since key actors are 
involved in all three. Each example raises the possibility that the coupling of streams by 
entrepreneurs is more straightforward in smaller and more manageable issues (even if their 
analytical separation began as a way to explain ‘organised anarchy’ in a small, single 
organisation – Cohen et al, 1972). 
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Identify the times when the usual rules of MSA seem not to apply 
Hall (1993) identifies the rare occasions in one political system (UK) in which the rules of 
policy softening and feasibility no longer apply: during crisis leading to paradigm change, the 
old ideas and their proponents are no longer relevant (albeit, Hall was not engaging with MSA 
– see Cairney, 2013: 283). Zhu’s (2008) MSA case study of China adds the possibility that, in 
some political systems with very different procedures to the US, the rules of softening may 
also not apply. Zhu identifies the role of technical infeasibility: actors can propose a politically 
acceptable solution that cannot be dealt with routinely by the governing bureaucracy, 
prompting high external and government attention, and potentially major policy change. The 
case study implication is so different to Kingdon’s that it reminds us to question the ‘universal’ 
applicability of any practical solution generated by MSA. 
Be realistic about the frequency and cause of windows of opportunity 
Howlett’s (1998) quantitative analysis of Canadian politics suggests that elections represent 
the most frequent source of a window of opportunity for policy change. He provides a way to 
challenge the idea of a serendipitous aligning of the stars which can happen at any moment, 
suggesting that planning for an election may be more sensible than for a random event.  Herweg 
et al (2015: 437) identify more specific drivers for policymakers: to pay attention to problems, 
including when it ‘puts the policy makers’ re-election at risk’; and, become receptive to 
solutions, including when the solution is popular among the public and key interest groups, or 
when the governing political party is seen as competent in this field and has made an ideological 
commitment to a particular approach. Such statements remind us of the important role of party 
competition in salient issues (since policy studies often downplay such dynamics).  
Note the difference between a window of opportunity for a broad idea or specific solution 
Cairney et al (2017: 118) suggest that, in the case of ‘prevention’ policy in the UK, 
policymakers ‘paid attention to an ill-defined problem and produced a solution which often 
proves to be too vague to operationalize in a simple way’. There was high support and 
enthusiasm to prompt a shift from reactive public services towards earlier intervention in 
people’s lives, but limited discussion of the specific ways in which they would deliver well-
defined solutions.  Such experiences remind us of the absence of a policy cycle with linear and 
ordered stages. If a cycle existed, this initial resolution of a problem at the agenda setting stage 
would be followed by more detailed solution production, formulation, and implementation. If 
not, an idea’s time may come and go without any meaningful resolution, beyond this broad 
commitment to do something. 
Conclusion 
It is important to tell the MSA story well. A concise and coherent theoretical story aids 
metaphorical and conceptual clarity, encourages a coherent research programme, and allows 
all relevant audiences - from expert policy scholars to scientists and practitioners in other fields 
and new students – to understand and communicate its insights in similar ways.  
To that end, I told the well-established story of MSA in relation to new debates on ‘evidence 
based policymaking’. In that context, MSA provides insights which might seem 
counterintuitive to actors less familiar with policy theories and still hoping for EBPM. Modern 
EBPM debates seem to be built on renewed hopes for comprehensive rationality and a linear 
policy cycle. In contrast, I describe policymaking in the real world by identifying the three 
strategies used by successful policy entrepreneurs. 
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First, entrepreneurs tell a persuasive story to frame a policy problem. Few problems reach the 
top of the agenda, and attention to problems is not dependent on the evidence of their size. 
Instead, policymakers face too much information, use ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ ways to process 
a lot of information, and make choices in a short space of time without being fully aware of 
their preferences. Policymakers seek to reduce ambiguity, by focusing on a simple definition 
of a complex problem, and uncertainty, by gathering information relevant to that definition. 
Entrepreneurs focus on the beliefs of their audience more than their assessment of the evidence. 
They reinforce the cognitive biases of influential policymakers by combining facts with values 
and emotional appeals, and by framing policy solutions as consistent with dominant ways to 
understand problems. If you simply bombard policymakers with evidence, they will have little 
reason to read it. If you win the ‘framing battle’, policymakers will demand evidence on your 
problem and solution.  
Second, entrepreneurs make sure that their favoured solution is available before attention 
lurches to the problem. There is no policy cycle in which policymakers identify problems, 
formulate solutions, and make a choice in that order. Instead, by the time policymakers pay 
attention to a problem it is too late to develop a technically and politically feasible solution 
from scratch. Solutions take time to ‘soften’ and become accepted within policy networks, and 
entrepreneurs seek opportunities to sell their solutions during heightened attention, by forming 
coalitions and engaging in networks to identify receptivity to policy solutions and an 
opportunity to act. 
Third, entrepreneurs exploit a ‘window of opportunity’ during which policymakers have the 
willingness and ability to adopt their policy solution. The role of entrepreneurs changes at 
different scales and in different systems. Further, modern studies highlight a wider range of 
strategies for entrepreneurs seeking to influence windows of opportunity, including: ‘venue 
shopping’ to seek more sympathetic audiences, encourage ‘venue shift’, and reduce the need 
to ‘soften’ policy solutions; engaging in multi-level policy networks to seek opportunities to 
import ‘pre-softened’ policy solutions; adapting to the idiosyncrasies of the policy 
environments in different political systems; as well as the more obvious value of linking 
problems to election debates and seeking solutions demonstrably popular with key parts of the 
public. 
This story may seem familiar to people who have read Kingdon (1984), but MSA has come a 
long way since his foundational text was published. We need to incorporate three decades of 
empirical application and conceptual refinement into a coherent modern MSA story and, while 
doing so, make sure that the meaning of its attractive metaphor remains clear. Only then can 
policy scholars be sure that their empirical applications of MSA form part of a far larger 
narrative of the policy process.  
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